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8.1 Introduction
Many countries undertake efforts towards participatory water management 
that consist of replacing top-down institutional structures with bottom-up 
and networked structures. These efforts can be explained by the instrumental 
and normative benefits expected from public participation, and the 
resulting promotion of ‘public participation’ by both international 
organizations and water scholars (see also Chapter 2 of this book). Debates 
around public participation indicate however that there are multiple views 
regarding the definitions and uses attributed to the concept. Gallie (1956) 
introduced the idea of an ‘essentially contested concept’ and identified the 
following five conditions that determine whether a concept is essentially 
contested:
•	 the concept denotes a valued achievement
•	 the achievement is internally complex although its worth is defined for 
the whole
•	 the achievement is ambiguous with different descriptions for different 
people
•	 the achievement is vague since its attribution can change contextually 
and temporally
•	 the users of the concept defend the way that they use it against the 
other users
In light of its multiple definitions and uses and general agreement with the 
above five conditions, public participation is considered to be an essentially 
contested concept. Several scholars have addressed the contested nature of 
public participation and the implications of this contestation. Day (1997) 
examines public participation in policy planning processes and identifies 
public participation as an essentially contested concept that reflects the 
nuances and difficulties of democracy and requires expertise even to grasp 
its complexity. Regarding public participation in water management, 
Sneddon and Fox (2007) touch upon the contestation of the concept. They 
WATER_GOVERNANCE.indb   128 16/04/2013   09:07
Turkey: public participation 129
examine a case in transboundary water management and observe that the 
multitude of national and international actors employ different meanings 
of public participation and use those meanings to pursue individual goals 
or to exert power over other actors. Taking a critical stance, Molle (2008) 
identifies public participation as a ‘nirvana concept’, meaning that, just like 
integrated water resources management (IWRM), public participation 
appears desirable and uncontroversial, whereas at the same time it conceals 
the politics of water management and can be exploited by certain groups 
for legitimizing their agendas. Molle further argues that the implementation 
of public participation relies on the essential roles of the state in empowering 
public members and of the experts in providing information, hence 
reflecting the power asymmetries instead of balancing them.
Thus, we can assert that public participation in water management often 
has a contested nature. However, the underlying mechanisms and the 
resulting implications of the contestation process in a particular time and 
space remain a research gap. These mechanisms and implications are 
particularly relevant in explaining the transfer of public participation to 
contexts with a history of non-participatory water management, since the 
contested nature of public participation can constitute an obstacle against 
effective transfer, i.e. the achievement of instrumental and/or normative 
benefits through introducing public participation. Accordingly, in this 
chapter we aim to improve the understanding about the contested nature 
of public participation by analysing the underlying mechanisms and the 
implications of contestation. In particular, we reflect on the following 
research questions:
•	 Why does the concept of public participation become contested in 
water management?
•	 What are the implications of the contested nature of public participation 
in water management on the effectiveness of its transfer to non-
participatory settings?
The outline of the chapter is as follows. In Section 8.2, we describe how we 
conceptualize the contested nature of public participation. Then in Sections 
8.3 and 8.4, we present our empirical findings from case studies in Turkey, 
where we examine the transfer of participatory approaches to the national 
framework of water management and to three cases at the local level. In 
Section 8.5, we discuss the similarities and differences of transfer to local 
cases. Finally, in Section 8.6, we revisit our research questions and draw on 
conclusions.
8.2 Conceptualizing the contested nature of public participation
Since the definitions and uses of a concept are used to indicate its contested 
nature, we choose to make use of a discourse analytic perspective in this 
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chapter. Discourse analysis constitutes an appropriate approach as it gives 
the opportunity to understand what shapes a social reality through 
examining the text and the context (Phillips and Hardy, 2002). The text 
includes the written and verbal communicative messages, whereas the 
context refers to the circumstances within which the text is generated. Analysis 
of discourses can be particularly useful for revealing the mechanisms 
through which the phenomena in the environmental domain are socially 
constructed and contested (Hajer and Versteeg, 2005). Being a key social 
phenomenon of environmental decision-making, public participation can 
thus be effectively analysed from such a discourse analytic perspective. As 
Table 8.1 shows, we formulate three questions to analyse the public 
participation discourses in water management.
Answering the three questions in Table 8.1 reveals the discursive positions 
of actors regarding the meanings and uses that they attribute to public 
participation. The second column of the table includes discursive positions 
that the multiple actors can possibly hold depending on the actual empirical 
settings. The first question addresses the discourses about the scope of the 
participants, which relates to representativeness and equity of public 
participation. The scope of the participants usually consists of a subset of 
the public, since involving everyone is often infeasible or unrealistic under 
time, money and human constraints (Mostert, 2003; Creighton, 2005; 
Özerol and Newig, 2008). However, contestation can arise when some 
actors, who are advantaged in terms of power and access to resources, 
become increasingly mentioned as stakeholders. In such cases, disadvantaged
Table 8.1 Questions regarding discursive positions about public participation
Questions Possible discursive positions 
1  Who is ‘the 
public’? 
•	 All individual and collective actors are potential/actual 
participants.
•	 Representation is biased towards the dominant/
advantaged actors.
•	 The scope of ‘the public’ is implicit and/or ambiguous.
2  What is ‘the 
participation’?
•	 Participation is an element of decision-making processes.
•	 Participation is symbolic (‘business-as-usual’ prevails).
•	 The scope of ‘the participation’ is implicit and/or 
ambiguous.
3  Why was public 
participation 
introduced?
•	 Public participation is an instrument to improve policy 
outcomes.
•	 Public participation is expected to contribute to the 
functioning of democracy.
•	 Public participation is an obligation imposed by external 
actors.
•	 The rationale behind public participation is implicit 
and/or ambiguous.
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actors such as women, smallholders and the poor are often excluded from 
the scope of participants as they lack the necessary power and resources. 
The second question relates to the discourses regarding the level or type of 
participation. In her highly cited paper, Arnstein (1969) identifies several 
types of participatory mechanisms as ‘non-participation’ or ‘tokenism’. 
These types of participation imply that either participation does not take 
place at all or it remains symbolic by not affecting the decision-making 
processes. In all types of participation, the scope of participation can 
become contested when actors attribute divergent or ambiguous definitions 
to it and use those definitions to further their interests. Therefore having 
clear boundaries for both the ‘public’ and ‘participation’ can improve the 
effectiveness of the transfer of public participation (Bressers and Lulofs, 
2010). Finally, the third question addresses the discourses about the 
normative and instrumental rationales behind the transfer of participation 
(Innes and Booher, 2004). Unless the discourses about the rationale of 
participation contradict each other, multiple discursive positions can be 
present.
According to the Contextual Interaction Theory, contextual factors 
influence policy implementation processes by influencing actor 
characteristics (see Chapter 3 of this book). As the context is a key element 
of discourses, we apply this premise of the Contextual Interaction Theory to 
analyse actors’ discourses regarding public participation. Accordingly, we 
assume that the discursive positions of different actors result from their 
characteristics (cognitions, resources and motivations) and are influenced 
by the wider, structural and case-specific contextual factors. Although they 
can vary with empirical cases, these positions address whether there is 
disagreement, uncertainty or ambiguity regarding the definition and use of 
‘public participation’ in a given case. If there are such positions, it can be 
inferred that public participation is contested. As we mentioned above, the 
contested nature of public participation constitutes an obstacle against its 
effectiveness. We further argue that the more contested public participation 
is, the more difficult it is to effectively transfer it. This argument relies on 
the idea that a high level of disagreement, uncertainty or ambiguity in 
discursive positions leads to a lower likelihood of achieving the benefits 
expected from public participation. The implications of the contested 
nature of public participation on its effective transfer can be unfolded by 
further investigating the discursive positions of different actors.
8.3 Public participation and water management in Turkey
Turkey is a relevant case to analyse the transfer of public participation to 
water management since many attempts are being made towards a 
transition from non-participatory to participatory management. Prior to 
the 1980s, Turkish public management in general, and water management 
in particular, was characterized by a top-down and centralist institutional 
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structure (Kibaroglu and Baskan, 2011). Since then, however, the country 
has been undergoing fundamental changes, which include among others 
the introduction of participatory mechanisms through the involvement of 
non-governmental actors in the planning, development and management 
of water resources. These changes can be attributed to various drivers 
such as the negotiation process to become a European Union (EU) 
member, the World Bank supported liberalization of the water sector, and 
the ongoing debates about water, energy and food security under the 
pressures of economic growth, population rise and climate change 
(Kibaroglu et al., 2009).
Previous experiences with public participation in the broader sphere of 
environmental decision-making have been limited in Turkey, yet they are 
increasing. For instance, several recent official documents and legislation 
refer to public participation. The latest national development plan (SPO, 
2006) pinpoints the importance of enhancing local decision-making 
capacity as well as knowledge sharing and partnerships between the public 
and private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The 
preparatory reports of the development plan, which are compiled by 
expert groups and NGO representatives, also mention public participation 
as a key element to incorporate into environmental decision-making 
(SPO, 2007a, 2007b). Along the same lines, the Environmental Law that 
was amended substantially in 2006 incorporates several environmental 
policy integration principles, including among others the participation of 
non-governmental actors in the decision-making processes. Another key 
legal document related to public participation in environmental decision-
making is the Regulation on Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), 
which was enacted in 1993 and revised three times as part of the EU 
harmonization process. Building on the EU EIA Directive, the regulation 
includes provisions regarding public consultations during the planning of 
large-scale infrastructure projects that can have significant environmental 
impact.
Despite the supportive outlook in policies and legislation, the fact that 
Turkey did not ratify the Aarhus Convention (UNECE, 1998) shows that 
access to information and public participation is lacking not only in water 
management, but also in all areas of environmental decision-making. 
Nevertheless, there are efforts to incorporate new participatory mechanisms 
and improve the implementation of the public participation processes. For 
instance, with support from the Dutch government and the European 
Commission, pilot projects have been implemented in western Turkey to 
establish the institutional background for the implementation of the EU 
Water Framework Directive, and public participation and knowledge 
dissemination have been identified as being among the most crucial topics 
for compliance with the requirements of the directive (Grontmij, 2005).
The agricultural sector has the highest share of national water use and 
agricultural water management has been substantially reformed since the 
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1990s (Kibaroglu et al., 2009). With financial and technical assistance from 
the World Bank, the Directorate General of State Hydraulic Works (Devlet 
Su İşleri, hereafter DSI) has undertaken the so-called ‘accelerated transfer 
programme’, which was inspired by the Mexican model of irrigation 
management transfer (Molle, 2008). This programme led to the 
establishment of water user organizations (WUOs) that took over the 
responsibility of implementing ‘participatory irrigation management’. Most 
of the WUOs in Turkey are irrigation associations or irrigation cooperatives, 
which are, in principle, responsible for surface water and groundwater, 
respectively (DSI, 2012). Although these two types of WUOs have legal and 
administrative differences, they are both structured around the idea of 
farmers’ participation in irrigation management. This idea continues to be 
one of the key messages of DSI, which argues that farmers’ awareness of 
irrigation and self-organization abilities enables them to internalize 
irrigation management, and thus ask for and contribute to infrastructure 
investments (DSI, 2011). The countrywide establishment of WUOs 
constitutes a substantial step towards increasing farmer participation and is 
considered a success by other countries and funding agencies (Vermillion, 
1997; Merrey et al., 2007). However, several issues such as the capture of 
WUOs’ top management by the local elite and the inadequate monitoring 
of WUOs’ performance impede effective implementation (Kadirbeyoğlu, 
2008; Kibaroglu et al., 2009; Özerol, 2013).
Similarly to the developments related to agricultural water management, 
hydropower development in Turkey has been under pressure to increase 
the involvement of non-governmental actors, particularly the private 
companies that came into play over the last decade (Kibaroglu et al., 
2009). The current government has embarked on an effort to promote 
small-scale hydroelectric facilities. The number is massive, with over 1,600 
of such facilities being planned for Turkey’s rivers over the coming 
decades. With the legal reform in 2001, use rights to the rivers are granted 
for forty-nine years to private companies to build small-scale, run-of-the-
river hydroelectric facilities. Such a transfer of rights from the state to the 
private sector led to considerable tensions over rivers. The participation 
of lay public members is one of the contested issues since many 
communities were not satisfied with the outcomes of participatory 
meetings during the EIA of hydropower projects. According to Scheumann 
et al. (2011), the public consultations that are part of the EIA procedure 
only receive interest due to the significance of the social impacts on the 
local communities and the resettlements that result from the hydropower 
projects.
The experiences of the last three decades show that the transitions taking 
place in agricultural water management and hydropower development are 
characterized by a top-down imposition of participatory mechanisms led by 
the successive governments and supportive international agencies. The 
provisions in the relevant planning and legislative documents adopt an 
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inclusive and participatory discourse. In practice, however, the NGOs can 
only minimally contribute and the lay public members are totally excluded 
from decision-making processes (Kibaroglu et al., 2009).
8.4 Case studies of public participation in Turkey’s water 
management
Turkey has seven subnational regions that differ in terms of geographical 
and climate conditions as well as cultural and ethnic backgrounds. To 
better understand how factors at the case-specific level influence public 
participation, we examine the following three cases:
1 South-Eastern Anatolian Region: the case of participatory irrigation 
management in the Harran Plain, where abundant surface water is 
transferred from the Euphrates River for irrigated agriculture.
2 Central Anatolian Region: the case of participatory irrigation 
management in the Konya Closed Basin, where scarce groundwater is 
extracted from wells for irrigated agriculture.
3 Black Sea Region: the case of public consultation in EIA during small-
scale hydropower development in the eastern part of the region.
We selected these regional cases for their political and social relevance for 
water management in Turkey. These regions also fall into the geographic 
focus of our ongoing research regarding water management in Turkey. 
To collect the discursive data about public participation in these cases, we 
used three types of data sources, namely documents, interviews and direct 
observation. The documents include previously generated text in the 
form of legislation, official reports, and scientific reports and articles. 
Through interviews and direct observation, we generated data that did 
not exist in the documents, which are produced mainly by corporate 
actors such as central and local administration units, professional 
organizations and NGOs. The opinions of certain actors, such as the water 
users and the middle-level personnel of governmental organizations, are 
not directly reflected in most of the documents. Therefore, we conducted 
semi-structured interviews to elicit the perspectives of such actors about 
the public participation processes and we made direct observations during 
our visits to the case study sites. For each case, we first examined the 
discourses to reveal the definitions and uses that different actors attribute 
to public participation. Then we investigated whether, how and why these 
attributions were contested through examining the disagreements, 
uncertainties or ambiguities in the discursive positions of the actors 
involved. In the following subsections, we present the description of the 
cases, followed by the discourses that were uncovered regarding public 
participation.
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Harran Plain
Harran Plain is located in Sanliurfa, one of the nine provinces in the 
South-Eastern Anatolian Project (Güneydoğu Anadolu Projesi, hereafter 
GAP). GAP is a multi-sector regional development programme that has 
been operating since the 1980s. Extensive irrigation is practiced in the 
plain using the Euphrates River’s waters, which are stored in the Atatürk 
Dam reservoir and transferred to the fields through the 26.2 km-long 
Sanliurfa Tunnels. A large-scale canal system irrigates an area of around 
1,500 km2 (Aküzüm et al., 1997). When the irrigation with water from the 
Euphrates started in 1995, the DSI stipulated the establishment of irrigation 
associations in the newly irrigated areas. Irrigation associations implement 
participatory irrigation management by operating and maintaining the 
irrigation canals, distributing water to the farmers and collecting the 
irrigation fee, which is intended to cover the expenses incurred by the 
WUOs. The DSI supports the irrigation associations through providing 
trainings, lending machinery and equipment, and giving technical advice. 
As the irrigated areas are expanded, new irrigation associations are 
established in the GAP region.
Who is ‘the public’?
In 2005, irrigation associations acquired the legal status of local administration 
associations under the Ministry of Interior through the Local Administration 
Associations Law. This provision implied the involvement of local 
administrators, namely the heads of villages and the mayors of municipalities, 
as the natural members of the top management of the irrigation associations. 
The Irrigation Associations Law, which was specifically crafted for the 
irrigation associations and enacted in March 2011, redefines the legal status 
of the irrigation associations as public legal entities. The enactment of a 
specific law and the change in the legal status of the irrigation associations 
imply a retreat of local administrations away from the management of 
irrigation associations, and a re-regulation of the management structure of 
the irrigation associations through specialized legal provisions.
The Irrigation Associations Law also contains a provision about assigning 
the number of votes according to the size of the land owned or used by the 
members of the irrigation association and grants a maximum of five votes to 
the farmers that own or use larger areas of land. Such a provision favours 
the participation of large-scale farmers over the disadvantaged farmers, 
whereas there are no mechanisms to facilitate the participation of 
disadvantaged farmers. Harran Plain is one of the regions that will be 
affected the most from this provision since the land is unequally distributed 
and the landlords already have additional power in the management of 
irrigation associations. A smallholder farmer summarizes his views on being 
involved in management: ‘You need to be aga [landlord] to manage things’. 
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Although it is among the mandates of participatory irrigation management, 
it is difficult to argue that the establishment of irrigation associations in 
Harran Plain enabled the involvement of disadvantaged groups in the 
decision-making processes. On the contrary, the hierarchical tribe 
structure continues to shape the management of irrigation associations 
(Özerol, 2013).
What is ‘the participation’?
Both the DSI and the irrigation associations focus on the participation of 
individual farmers, which mainly occurs through their payment of the 
irrigation fee each year and voting in the irrigation association elections 
every four years. When it comes to the social interactions of farmers both 
with the top management and the staff of irrigation associations, the 
persistence of tribal culture, which relies on strong ties among the 
members of large families, is substantial (Özerol, 2013). The informal 
relationships are exploited in order to get things done by any type of 
organization: ‘If you want to be served by the government offices, you 
need uncles [relatives or friends to ask for help]’. The tribal culture also 
leads to the prioritization of kinship and friendship relations over official 
relationships. This creates an uncertainty as to how management processes 
work and obstructs the enforcement of sanctions on the individual farmers 
and the irrigation associations when they violate the rules of irrigation 
management.
Regarding the enforcement of sanctions, the positions of farmers and 
DSI are relevant. Among the farmers, a common opinion about the 
functioning of irrigation associations is that ‘irrigation associations just 
distribute the water’. Many farmers also think that the irrigation associations 
waste the fees that they collect from the farmers. However, until the 
enactment of the Irrigation Associations Law, the irrigation associations 
were not accountable to farmers, since the farmers were not members of 
the associations. The legal status of irrigation associations has also been an 
issue for DSI, since it lacked the legal power to enforce sanctions against the 
irrigation associations that neglect the maintenance of irrigation and 
drainage canals. Being local administration associations, the irrigation 
associations were administratively and financially accountable to the 
Ministry of Interior, which lacked the technical capacity to monitor the 
administrative and financial performance of the irrigation associations. 
With the enactment of the Irrigation Associations Law, the individual 
farmers gained the right to become members of irrigation associations, and 
DSI became the main administrative and technical auditor of the 
associations. Thus, the law changes the legal background for the 
accountability of irrigation associations to farmers and DSI. However, the 
enforcement of provisions towards improving the monitoring of 
administrative and technical performance remains to be seen.
WATER_GOVERNANCE.indb   136 16/04/2013   09:07
Turkey: public participation 137
Why was participation introduced?
The DSI has transferred the operation and management responsibility of 
almost all the irrigation schemes it constructed (DSI, 2012). In the preamble 
of the Irrigation Associations Law, the key rationale behind the transfer 
programme is expressed as
the need to decrease the public expenditure on the operation, 
maintenance and repair of irrigation infrastructure, to improve the 
quality and speed of services, and to increase the collection rate of 
irrigation fees through creating the sense of ownership of farmers 
regarding the irrigation facilities
Such expectations are valid in many transfer programmes implemented 
throughout the world (Vermillion, 1997). In the Turkish case, all actors 
highlight the realization of economic expectations. However, there are 
criticisms about the lack of ownership by the farmers, since the irrigation 
infrastructure is deteriorated in many areas, including the relatively new 
infrastructure in the Harran Plain. A related item on the agenda of all 
related governmental organizations is to train the farmers in better 
irrigation management practices. If training were crucial to improve 
farmers’ capacity in irrigation management, the farmers should have been 
trained well before the irrigation management transfer (Merrey et al., 
2007). However, this was not the case in Harran Plain, and farmers’ training 
is still considered a ‘to-do’ after having practiced irrigated agriculture for 
more than a decade, and the ‘blame-the-farmers’ rhetoric of the 
governmental organizations remains valid.
According to the DSI officials, farmers are currently managing the 
irrigation systems themselves and irrigation associations have financial 
and administrative autonomy, which is considered as a big achievement of 
the irrigation management transfer. However, the farmers in Harran 
Plain disagree with this argument and continue to see the state as the 
ultimate decision maker and problem solver. Particularly, the smallholder 
and landless farmers have little faith in the capacity or willingness of 
irrigation associations to solve problems such as lack of canal maintenance 
and unequal distribution of water. On the other hand, many govern-
mental and non-governmental actors consider the DSI as the ‘dominant’ 
and ‘reputable’ actor, both in teaching and imposing roles in the 
management of irrigation systems. This role of DSI constitutes an obstacle 
for entering into collaboration with other relevant actors, such as the 
Directorate General of Agrarian Reform, which carries out land 
consolidation and land distribution in many irrigated areas in Turkey 
including the Harran Plain.
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Konya Closed Basin
Konya Closed Basin is a large-size basin (over 50,000 km2) that encloses five 
provinces. The basin is a prominent agricultural area, where mainly 
irrigated and groundwater-dependent agriculture are practiced. Major 
agricultural products are water-thirsty plants such as sugar beet and maize, 
which are supported through price subsidies by the government. The 
on-farm irrigation method is primarily surface irrigation, whereas less than 
5 per cent of the land is irrigated using the water-saving drip or sprinkle 
systems. The basin faces major water problems such as excessive water 
withdrawal and use, and the water users – especially the farmers in the 
region – bear the economic consequences.
The rate of groundwater withdrawal (over 4.5 billion m3 per annum) in 
the basin is higher than that of replenishment (around 2 billion m3 per 
annum), which causes a c.3 m annual drop in the groundwater table. Excess 
withdrawal primarily originates from the illegal wells drilled by farmers in 
their fields. DSI discloses that as high as 70,000 out of c.100,000 wells are 
illegal (not licensed by the DSI). As the groundwater retreats deeper each 
year, farmers encounter higher energy costs for water withdrawal, which in 
turn harms their products’ competitiveness in the market and the 
sustainability of their agricultural income. Farmers typically refer to energy 
costs as one of the highest and continually increasing items in their cost 
structure. Groundwater in this basin is pumped from wells as deep as 100 m.
The environmentally unsustainable situation in the basin continues to 
attract the attention of NGOs who see farmers’ irrigation habits and the 
irrigation infrastructure as the origins of the water problems. To help limit 
this they are running capacity-building and infrastructural projects in the 
area. Despite the ongoing efforts of NGOs, specifically the World Wide 
Fund for Nature (WWF) and the academic organizations in the region, 
there is still a lot to do to improve the sustainability of water resources in the 
basin.
Who is ‘the public’?
Inhabitants of the basin are farmers who have similar preferences in terms 
of crop choice (sugar beet) and irrigation method (furrow irrigation). 
Several parties, including the local agricultural authority, the DSI, the 
agricultural engineering department of the local university, NGOs and the 
regional utility company, have expectations about farmers’ behaviour, such 
as changing the way they practice agricultural activities. Their suggestions 
are centred on saving water by changing irrigation methods and crops. The 
public, often considered as being only the farmers and occasionally 
including the irrigation associations and cooperatives, is characterized as 
‘non-cooperative’ because of their reluctance to follow suggestions related 
to water sustainability. Among the parties mentioned above, there is a 
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common tendency to view the public as ignorant, and even unconscious 
about the requirements of their core business.
Similar to the Harran Plain case, irrigation associations manage the 
surface water and irrigation cooperatives manage the groundwater in Konya 
Closed Basin. How local authorities perceive irrigation associations and 
cooperatives varies and depends on their operations. Some irrigation 
associations and cooperatives are known for their historically embedded 
malpractices, which are often overlooked by the local authorities, mainly 
due to the lack of institutions and legislations that monitor and control the 
operations of these organizations. Nevertheless, there are some irrigation 
cooperatives known for their good practices in terms of the sustainability of 
the water and well-being of the community.
What is ‘the participation’?
Farmers’ participation in Konya Closed Basin is often used interchangeably 
with ‘contribution’ to the infrastructure costs and ‘taking responsibility’ for 
sustainability of water. The irrigation associations have been suffering from 
severe water loss in the open-top secondary and tertiary canals. The DSI 
proposed the renewal of the system with closed-section canals and covered 
half of the costs on behalf of the associations, provided credit with favourable 
terms for the remaining half and asked the associations to collect the credit 
from their members. In some associations, farmers were reluctant to pay 
the irrigation fee, both because their income is very limited and because 
they believed that the government should pay for this service upgrade. As 
one farmer stated: ‘Everyone claims a part of my little income: the utility 
company, the irrigation association, the [agricultural production] 
cooperative… Do they want me to starve? It is I who should be supported’. 
The government regards these as operational costs to be borne by the 
farmer and thus does not sympathize with the previous types of statements. 
Similarly, irrigation associations are blamed for mismanagement by the 
farmers and by some other parties such as DSI and regional government 
agencies.
The responsibility for sustainable water use is a rather new demand that 
has been placed onto farmers. They are expected to follow suggestions such 
as shifting to drip irrigation, adjusting their crop selection for less water 
consuming types and not opening new irrigation wells. However, farmers 
see little incentive to follow these suggestions. An academic, experienced in 
some pilot projects in the region, puts it this way: ‘It is hard to persuade 
them that they will get the same productivity with less water.’
Almost all parties agree that raising awareness among the farmers proved 
to be inefficient, and the best way to cooperate with them is through proper 
incentive and sanctioning mechanisms. Heavy sanctions however, will not 
always induce the desired cooperative behaviour. Regarding the 
continuously dropping groundwater table, opening new irrigation wells in 
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the basin is forbidden yet farmers keep opening illegal wells in their farms. 
As the head of DSI regional office comments:
It is illegal, yet I understand them… They need water to survive and the 
existing wells are not sufficient. What we need to do at this point is 
legalize the existing illegal wells and regulating their use through some 
quotas.
Why was participation introduced?
Participation is often confined to ‘contribution to costs’ by several parties. 
Yet, there is consensus on the idea that participation is regarded as the 
foremost requirement of water sustainability. The DSI, academia and NGOs 
agree upon the same game-theoretic proposition:
If left alone, all farmers will act in their own interest and open new 
irrigation wells, spend more water than they need and deplete the 
groundwater faster. We need to convince them otherwise and make 
them aware of the greater good.
In the eyes of DSI, participation is also a means to engage farmers in the 
decisions:
When asked to contribute financially, farmers are better at adopting 
the new systems. That is why we ask for a 50 per cent contribution from 
the farmers to the closed canal system infrastructure. This way, they will 
be more inclined to protect the close canal system.
Although participation practices are open to debate, some benefits are 
generally recognized. Academia and NGOs who run capacity-building and 
awareness-raising projects create quite an interest among the nearby 
farmers. Financial gains are still regarded as the most important outcome of 
practices that are being promoted in these projects. A farmer comments on 
this situation:
Farmers in Altınekin [where a pilot project on drop irrigation is 
implemented by WWF] are getting the same crop as I do, but pay less 
for the water and electricity they consume to access to water. I want this 
project in my village, too.
Eastern Black Sea Region
The Eastern Black Sea Region has a basin area of 24,077 km2 and is one of 
the richest basins when it comes to hydropower potential in Turkey. The 
basin has increasingly become the site of private hydropower development 
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after the legal reforms of 2001. Due to its geographical and topographical 
advantages (high precipitation level, steep valleys), the region is among the 
most preferred places for the run-of-river type hydropower facilities. The 
estimated contribution of this region to the small-scale hydroelectric 
potential of Turkey is around 16 per cent (Uzlu et al., 2011). As a result, at 
least 300 projects are licensed and in the process of construction. Despite its 
energy potential, the basin also hosts many species as well as 2.5 million 
people, many of whose livelihoods depend on these rivers.
This small-scale hydropower development is regulated by ‘water-use right 
contracts’ that are prepared by the DSI. Accordingly, water-use rights to 
produce electricity are granted to companies for only forty-nine years. Since 
these contracts allow the privatization of water-use rights, communities now 
have limited or no rights to use the river for other purposes such as their 
domestic and agricultural use. As emphasized in the contracts, the ultimate 
rights of rivers belong to the state, and private companies obtain user rights. 
However, the company is responsible for the construction, management, 
operation and security of facilities and the potential risks derived from the 
usage of rivers. Because rights and responsibilities over the use of rivers are 
transferred to the private entities, there are serious uprisings from the rural 
communities in the region regarding their exclusion both in the current 
legal framework and in the decision-making processes.
Who is ‘the public’?
Stakeholders from the public and the private sector can participate in the 
decision-making process through the EIA notification meetings. According 
to the Ministry of Environment, the transparent and democratic 
participation of different stakeholders is a necessary condition in the EIA 
process, since it is a process for finding out and preventing the future social 
and environmental implications of development programmes (Ahmad and 
Wood, 2002). The term ‘public’ is used to allow everybody to participate in 
the EIA legislation of 2008 (Scheumann et al., 2011). The private sector and 
affected communities have various views on the effectiveness of EIA 
meetings. Some of the locals from the region argue that meetings are far 
from being inclusive and democratic in practice. The majority of the 
communities do not participate in these meetings because they believe 
their views are being ignored and undermined. Private sector are willing to 
organize these meetings however some perceived them as loss of time and 
money.
What is ‘the participation’?
The EIA process and thus the participation of the public only enter the 
project processes at the later stages of development (Scheumann et al., 
2011). As a part of this process, EIA meetings are designed for consultation 
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and sharing of information but the outcomes barely influence the decision 
making. Especially in the case of the Eastern Black Sea Region, public 
participation is very limited due to the high level of distrust between the 
local people and private companies. Some villagers choose not to recognize 
the process because they feel alienated from the process. Local knowledge 
and values are not recognized and excluded from the decision-making 
process.
Social and environmental concerns led to the mobilization of a powerful 
opposition towards hydroelectricity projects in the region. Apart from the 
activist groups in the Mediterranean Region (southern Turkey), such as 
Save Alakir Network and Yuvarlakcay Protection Platform, many other 
activist groups from the Black Sea region like Karadeniz Resurrection, 
Brotherhood of Rivers Platform and Ikizdere Association protest against 
hydropower projects during the EIA meetings. In many of these cases, non-
participation has also become a position since some groups argue that 
participation would imply an indirect support of the process.
Why was participation introduced?
The international regulations and EU approximation process have 
influenced the EIA processes in Turkey. Recent changes in the EIA 
regulation have put more emphasis on public participation. Accordingly, 
stakeholders have to be informed and consulted about projects during the 
planning process. However, there is no consensus on the rationale behind 
introducing public participation into the planning of hydropower projects. 
According to the Ministry of Environment and Urbanization, public 
participation is necessary to build trust between communities and project 
owners and to provide a more transparent process by influencing the EIA 
process before projects are approved. This position is in line with the 
argument that the inclusion of public opinions in the EIA can lead to the 
development of a sense of ownership and reduce conflict (Shepherd and 
Bowler, 1997). However, a DSI official explains: ‘The state is the ultimate 
owner of these rivers, we can consult people but at the end we are making 
the final decision’.
Although controversial in terms of inclusiveness, EIA notification 
meetings are the only platform bringing the public and the private sectors 
together. Through these meetings, people get information and express 
their opinions about the projects. However, due to the distrust between 
stakeholders, most often these meetings do not create a platform for a 
dialogue. On one hand, the majority of the private sector perceives EIA 
notification meetings as ineffective and time-consuming and, thus, not cost 
effective. On the other hand, some villagers perceived that the EIAs ‘serve 
for the advertisement of their company’.
In the Eastern Black Sea Region, the active resistance groups against 
hydropower projects perceive EIA meetings as a mechanism that perpetuates 
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the privatized water development regardless of the opposite views of the 
local people. However, some companies do recognize the importance of 
people’s consent as we see in the Yuvarlakcay case in south-western Turkey, 
where a company has withdrawn its project as a result of the local resistance 
(Islar, 2010).
8.5 Discussion: the contested nature and the transfer of  
public participation
The analysis of discursive positions in three cases of public participation in 
Turkish water management reveals both similarities and differences 
regarding the contested nature of public participation. These similarities 
and differences can be attributed to various contextual factors as well as the 
characteristics of the actors.
Constituting typical examples of participatory irrigation management, 
the Harran Plain and the Konya Closed Basin cases provide insights about 
the interactions among the water users (individual farmers and WUOs) and 
the DSI. The discursive disagreements and differences among the water 
users and the DSI can be attributed to the imposition of the participatory 
approach on farmers without making sure that the farmers possess the 
required individual and organizational capacities for irrigation management 
so that they could share similar meanings of ‘participation’. Furthermore, 
the scope of the ‘public’ is often limited to the local elite and the powerful 
farmers that have easier access to physical and financial resources. This 
power asymmetry is, in most situations, taken for granted by both the 
farmers and the DSI although it implies an ‘elite capture’, which can 
influence the decisions and inhibit the enforcement of sanctions 
(Kadirbeyoğlu and Özertan, 2011).
In the Eastern Black Sea Region case, participatory mechanisms are 
incorporated into the processes of hydropower planning. This case 
complements the other cases in terms of both the sectoral use of water 
resources and the phase of water management. Similar to the other cases, 
public participation is contested due to the divergent uses attributed to 
‘participation’. While the DSI and the private sector perceive the 
involvement of the public as a way to share information and consultation, 
local communities demand a more active role in the decision-making 
process. The Eastern Black Sea Region differs from the other two cases in 
two aspects. First, the affected local communities mobilize against the 
mechanisms that exclude their effective participation and, thus, aim to 
extend the scope of ‘public’. Second, the role of DSI is less prominent in 
the participatory process since the risks and responsibilities of hydropower 
development are partly transferred to private actors (the companies taking 
over the use right of water resources). Nevertheless, in all the cases, the DSI 
holds the property rights for water. This fact positions the DSI as a prominent 
actor in the governance system as well as the ultimate decision-maker. The 
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scope and the forms of participation by other parties, including public 
members and private actors, are shaped by the discourse that the DSI leads.
The contextual factors and the characteristics of actors influence the 
implications of the contested nature of public participation. The long-
standing hierarchical structure in the Harran Plain manifests itself in all 
types of decision-making processes and limits the scope of the public to a 
privileged group. Furthermore, the lack of previous experience in irrigation 
management and the abrupt devolution of responsibility to the newly 
established irrigation associations are key determinants of the ongoing 
discourse on the incapability of farmers and their organizations in really 
participating in participatory irrigation management. Similarly, in the 
Konya Closed Basin case, actors’ capacity play a prominent role in the way 
participation is interpreted and practised. References related to the 
incapability of farmers were often heard, which might explain why the 
discursive positions about participation are confined to contributing to 
costs and following the suggestions provided by the more capable actors, 
neither of which is a genuine form of participation. Resistance movements 
in the Eastern Black Sea Region case show that effective and inclusive 
participation is a necessary condition for both the future of hydropower 
development projects and social and political sustainability. Many projects 
cannot even be constructed due to the active resistance that eventually 
requires additional money, labour and time from the private companies. 
According to a lawyer from the Turkish Water Assembly, around 100 
(almost half of the total proposed) projects are on hold due to court 
decisions (Y. Okumusoglu, personal communication, 2012).
8.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we elaborated on the underlying mechanisms of the 
contested nature of public participation in water management and the 
implications of this contested nature on its transfer to non-participatory 
settings. Our empirical findings indicate that public participation becomes 
contested when actors with divergent characteristics attribute different 
definitions and uses to the concept. Combined with the influence of 
contextual factors, these divergent characteristics lead to several implications 
about the transfer of public participation to top-down and hierarchical 
water management settings. The immaturity regarding the adoption of 
participatory mechanisms in the broader arenas of environmental decision-
making are also reflected in the water sector.
At the case-specific level, the low degree of individual and institutional 
capacity to engage proactively in the decision-making processes constitutes 
an obstacle in clarifying and expanding the boundaries of public 
participation. Despite the possibility of involving a broader scope of 
participants in multiple phases of decision-making processes, the more 
powerful actors continue to shape the dominant definition of public 
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participation. Therefore, introducing participatory mechanisms that have 
been developed by external actors such as the EU and the World Bank 
remains insufficient for overcoming the power asymmetries and hierarchical 
structures at the local level.
The effectiveness of the transfer of participatory mechanisms to top-
down and hierarchical water management settings can be improved in 
several ways. Regarding the implementation of participatory irrigation 
management, ensuring the involvement of disadvantaged farmers, primarily 
the landless and smallholder farmers, is of utmost importance. Furthermore, 
when the managerial and financial performance of WUOs are in question, 
the monitoring and evaluation by third-party (or independent) organizations 
can be useful to change the perception of farmers and other actors about 
the functioning of the WUOs. For the participatory planning of hydropower 
development, an independent stakeholder advisory group, which can voice 
local concerns, provide local knowledge, help to identify key issues and 
facilitate cooperation between different groups, can contribute to the 
public participation processes.
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